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We develop a dynamic model to assess the effects of policy expectations on crop supply and illus-
trate the approach with estimates of the effects of base updating in U.S. crop programs. For corn
and soybeans in the Corn Belt, the effect of base updating is relatively small because relevant
crop alternatives are subject to similar policies and the alternatives are substitutes in production.
Increasing acreage of one program crop to capture future payments from base updating reduces
future payments from the alternative crop. We also use our model to assess the effect of base
updating on acreage response to prices.
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Expectations of policies affect the economic
responses to those policies. This intuitive
notion was formalized by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), who showed that it was
not optimal for policymakers to determine a
future set of policies based on the economic
response to each policy because individuals
adjust their behavior based on their expecta-
tion of subsequent policy changes. Of course,
farmers are also likely to adjust their behav-
ior to expectations of evolving agricultural
policy.
The effect of expected future policies on
farm production has been examined recently
in the context of programs for which the
amount of farm subsidy is not tied directly to
current production, but rather to some his-
torical base production. However, if current
production may become the base from which
subsidies are calculated, current production
may affect future payments, and this recog-
nition means that the future base calculation
affects the payoff to current production. For
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example, direct and counter-cyclical pay-
ments for program crops in the United States
have been calculated according to historical
planting and yields (i.e., the crop “base”),
so that current production does not affect
current program payments. Farmers, how-
ever, may anticipate that current production
will affect future program payments due to
future policy changes through base updating.
Indeed, the 2002 Farm Bill did allow farms to
update their base to more recent acreage and
yields. Farmers who expected future updates
would naturally alter their production plans
in response to how much such an anticipated
update raised the expected present value of
per unit revenue (Sumner 2003). Production
distortions from these dynamic considera-
tions are similar to previous programs where
farm payments were tied to a moving average
of historical planted acreage (de Gorter and
Fisher 1993).
Recent articles have attempted to model
the effect of expected base updating for a
single program crop on current production
(e.g., McIntosh, Shogren, and Dohlman 2007;
Bhaskar and Beghin 2010). However, such
studies that model the effect of expectations
about policy changes by considering a single
crop neglect the full set of policy expecta-
tions that affect production of that crop,
just as models that ignore cross-price effects
neglect the full set of incentives that affect
production decisions. For example, if farmers
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expect that the base will be updated for one
program crop, then they will likely expect
that base to be updated for other relevant
program crops. Further, if the program crops
are substitutes or complements in produc-
tion, then the production of one will also be
affected by the expectation of base updating
of the related crops.
In this paper, we develop a model of a rep-
resentative farm that maximizes returns from
producing two program crops, including the
discounted stream of expected government
payments. The farmer chooses the acreage
to plant to each crop, where current acreage
affects the stream of future government pay-
ments through expected base updating. We
obtain closed-form solutions for the effect
of expected base updating on program crop
acreage and the effect of expected base
updating on acreage response to market
prices.
The effect of expected base updating on
acreage depends on the degree to which
alternative program crops are substitutes or
complements in production, as well as the rel-
ative payment rate between program crops.
If two program crops are strong substitutes
in production, then farmers who expect base
updating may actually decrease acreage of
the crop with a lower governmental payment
rate. Furthermore, in every case, the effect of
expected base updating on acreage is over-
estimated for the crop with a high payment
rate if updating for the alternative program
crop is ignored. If the alternative crop is a
non-program crop that does not result in a
loss of payment eligibility, then the effect of
expected base updating on the program crop
can simply be modeled in a single crop con-
text. If planting the alternative crop results in
a loss of payment eligibility, then current pay-
ments are already tied directly to the acreage
decision (Just and Kropp 2013).
While we illustrate the model and mea-
surements with the case of base updating
for direct and counter-cyclical payments in
the United States, our results demonstrate
the broader principle of the importance
of modeling the multicrop nature of agri-
culture to understand the effect of policy
expectations. In general, the total effect of
the policy expectation must account for
the jointness of agricultural production. So,
for example, our results are also relevant
to evaluating the production effects of the
Single Payment Scheme in Europe, where
current payments are also not tied to current
production.
We also extend the literature on the pro-
duction effects of expected policy change by
modeling the effect on acreage response
to market price. Much of the literature
addressing the effect of government pro-
grams on supply response to market price
has attempted to control for government
programs in the econometric analysis (e.g.,
Houck and Ryan 1972; Lee and Helmberger
1985). McDonald and Sumner (2003) argue
that these approaches do not allow recovery
of the “structural” supply parameters that
are not conditional on existing government
programs. Our approach follows that of
McDonald and Sumner (2003), who simulate
the effect of government programs on supply
response—which can then be used to recover
the “structural” supply response.
As noted, we provide a closed-form
solution, rather than relying on numerical
methods to obtain a solution. This makes
our results more transparent to assumptions
about parameter values. Although we report
results for different combinations of param-
eters, the reader can readily calculate the
effect on production with their own assump-
tions about parameter values. Our results
are also not subject to smoothness concerns
derived from relying on discrete methods.
Bhaskar and Beghin’s (2010) stochastic
dynamic programming model is sufficiently
complicated that they consider only four
discrete acreage options each year, which
causes them to report results that may be
larger or smaller than the true impacts from
the model.
We apply our model to the acreage of corn
and soybeans in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana
by simulating the effects of expected base
updating on acreage and acreage response
to market prices across a range of parameter
values. We find that expected base updat-
ing leads to a small increase in corn acreage
and a small decrease in soybean acreage,
since the two crops are substitutes in pro-
duction, and corn has a larger government
payment rate per acre. Our results may also
be interpreted in light of recent (2012 and
2013) policy discussions. Many corn and soy-
bean growers may now expect that direct
payments will be eliminated. Our results indi-
cate that this revision of policy expectations
would cause a small decrease in corn acreage
and a small increase in soybean acreage.
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We also find that expected base updating
dampens both the own-price and cross-price
acreage responses.
While we examine the effect of expected
base updating on production, we also recog-
nize that a substantial body of literature
has identified several other avenues by
which current payments that are not tied
to current production may distort current
production. The increase in a farmer’s wealth
from government payments may affect pro-
duction by decreasing risk aversion (e.g.,
Hennessy 1998; Just 2011; Serra, Goodwin,
and Featherstone 2011), easing credit con-
straints (e.g., Roe, Somwaru, and Diao 2002;
Girante, Goodwin, and Featherstone 2008),
increasing labor supplied to farming (e.g.,
Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre 2006; Key
and Roberts 2009), and increasing farm
survival (Chau and de Gorter 2005). Since
counter-cyclical payments depend on prices,
they reduce the probability of low returns
and may increase acreage for risk averse
farmers, or increase available credit (e.g.,
Hennessy 1998; Antón and Mouël 2004; Lin
and Dismukes 2007).
Several studies have attempted to estimate
the effect of such payments on production
by regressing some measure of production
on government payments after correcting
for their endogeneity (e.g., Goodwin and
Mishra 2006; O’Donoghue and Whitaker
2010; Weber and Key 2012). This direct
econometric evidence does not separate
production impacts due to expected base
updating from production impacts through all
other avenues.
Literature Review on the Production Effects
of Base Updating
One example in the literature of policy
expectations affecting production is through
expected base updating. Direct and counter-
cyclical payments in the United States are
calculated according to historical plant-
ing and yields (i.e., the crop “base”), so
that current production does not affect cur-
rent program payments. If the government
updates base acres in the future, then current
planting decisions will affect a farmer’s future
government payments, which provides an
incentive to plant program crops to increase
(or not lose) future government payments.
The base updating allowed in the 2002 Farm
Bill likely influenced farmers to increase
their probability of another update in future
legislation, thus creating a stronger link
between direct and counter-cyclical payments
and production decisions (Sumner 2003).
Coble, Miller, and Hudson (2008) report
results from a survey of Iowa and Missis-
sippi farmers. In 2005, farmers believed that
they would be able to update base acres
in the next farm bill with a 40% probabil-
ity, on average. About 4% of Iowa farmers
reported adjusting acreage in anticipation
of base updating. Mississippi farmers were
more likely to report adjusting acreage, with
10.2% of soybean farmers and 15.7% of cot-
ton farmers reporting an adjustment due to
an anticipated base update. Goodwin and
Mishra (2005) report results from a national
survey conducted by USDA that indicate
17.5% of farmers consider base updating
important for their acreage decisions.
McIntosh, Shogren, and Dohlman (2007)
conduct an experiment to assess the allo-
cation of “tokens” between a program crop
and a non-program crop under price and
policy uncertainty with programs designed
to be similar to direct and counter-cyclical
payments. These authors were unable to find
statistically significant evidence that partici-
pants allocated more tokens to the base when
there was a possibility of updating base. The
authors note that their policy uncertainty
also included the possibility that the pro-
gram could be eliminated altogether, which
reduced the incentive to increase base for
possible updating.
Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) consider a
representative Iowa corn farmer who max-
imizes the expected stream of discounted
utility of market returns and government
payments that could be affected by base
updating. Prices and yield shocks are uncer-
tain. The stochastic dynamic programming
model that they construct does not have a
closed-form solution, so they solve the model
numerically. For their assumed parameters,
Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) find that antic-
ipating a voluntary update of base acres
in 2007 would increase the average acres
planted to corn from 2003 to 2007 by as much
as 6.25%. These authors’ results also show
that the effect on acreage decisions depends
on anticipated prices since counter-cyclical
payments are only made when prices are low;
they do not find any substantial effect of base
updating on yields through greater nitrogen
application.
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U.S. Farm Commodity Programs
We develop our model of policy expectations
for the case of farm commodity programs
in the United States. In particular, we focus
on direct and counter-cyclical payments and
the effects of expected base updating. Before
developing the model, we provide a brief
description of the programs.
Direct payments are calculated as:
(1) DPjt = λdDjBYjt BAjt ,
where DPjt is the direct payment for crop
j in year t, λd is a discount factor for direct
payments set by legislation, Dj is the direct
payment rate set by policy, BYjt denotes the
base yield, and BAjt denotes the base acres.
A farmer receives the direct payment if the
land is used for agricultural purposes, with
the exception of planting almost all fruits,
vegetables, melons, tree nuts, and wild rice
(Farm Service Agency 2008).
Counter-cyclical payments are triggered
when the “effective price” falls below the
“target price” for a particular program crop.
The amount paid is expressed as
CCPjt = λc max
(
0,TPj−max
(
LRj,pjt
)
(2)
− Dj
)
BYjt BA
j
t ,
where CCPjt is the counter-cyclical payment
for crop j in year t, λc is a discount factor
for counter-cyclical payments set by legis-
lation, TPj is the target price set by policy,
LRj is the loan rate set by policy, and pjt is the
marketing year average price for crop j. The
“effective price” is the direct payment rate
plus the higher of the loan rate or the market
price. As with direct payments, the farmer is
eligible to receive counter-cyclical payments
if the land is used for agricultural purposes
with the same exceptions. For example, if a
farmer has corn base and grows soybeans,
then the farmer will receive counter-cyclical
payments if the effective price of corn falls
below the target price for corn. Even if the
price of soybeans is high, the farmer will
receive counter-cyclical payments based on
the payment calculation for corn.
For simplicity, we assume that the discount
factor is the same for direct and counter-
cyclical payments (λd = λc = λ),1 and that
base yields and base acres are the same
for direct and counter-cyclical payments.2
Adding equations (1) and (2) provides an
approximation for the total base payment:
BPjt = λ max
(
Dj,TPj − max
(
LRj,pjt
))
(3)
BYjt BA
j
t = θj
(
pjt
)
BYjt BA
j
t .
The payment rate for base (i.e., payment per
bushel of base) is denoted as θj(pjt). Equation
(3) provides a stylized representation of the
total direct and counter-cyclical payments for
our model.
Loan deficiency payments are triggered
when market prices fall below the loan
rate. Eligible farmers receive the posi-
tive difference between a county-specific
loan rate and the posted county price—the
government’s measure of the local market
price—multiplied by the farmer’s production:
LDPjt = max
(
0,LRj − pjt
)
yjta
j
t(4)
= ηj
(
pjt
)
yjta
j
t ,
where LDPjt is the loan deficiency payment
for crop j in year t, LRj is the loan rate, pjt is
the market price (i.e., posted county price),
yjit is the yield, and a
j
it represents the planted
acres for crop j. The payment rate for loan
deficiency payments (i.e., payment per bushel
of production) is denoted as ηj(pjt).
Base Updating in a Multicrop Context
We develop a stylized model to examine
the effect of the probability of base updat-
ing occurring on program crop acreage and
acreage response to market price. To sim-
plify the exposition, we develop the model
with two crops that we refer to as corn and
soybeans, since this corresponds directly
1 In the 2002 Farm Bill, the discount factor was 0.85 for direct
and counter-cyclical payments. The 2008 Farm Bill changed the
discount factor to 0.833 for direct payments.
2 Base yield can differ for direct and counter-cyclical payments
due to the option to update counter-cyclical payment yields in
the 2002 Farm Bill.
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to our numerical simulations of corn and
soybean production in Iowa, Illinois, and
Indiana. Extending the model to other com-
modity contexts would mean using a different
set of parameter values in the numerical
simulations—including the addition of other
program crops, non-program crops, and crops
for which planting is precluded on base acres.
Our model is stylized in that we make several
simplifying assumptions that allow the model
to be tractable and transparent, yet maintain
core features of the problem.
Assumptions
Assumption 1. Risk neutrality.
This article analyzes how farmers alter
their current acreage decisions in order to
capture benefits of expected returns from
potential base updating in the future. To the
extent that base updating also affects the
variation in expected returns, then risk averse
farmers may alter their current acreage in
order to capture benefits from a reduction
in the future variation of expected returns as
well. Most of the effect of base updating on
current acreage decisions is likely to occur
through changes in the relative expected
returns of alternative crops, rather than
through changes in the relative expected
variation of returns of alternative crops. Thus,
omitting risk aversion is likely to have a neg-
ligible impact on our results. Assuming risk
neutrality makes an analytical solution to our
model much more tractable.
Assumption 2. Yields are stochastic and
exogenous.
We assume that crop yields are uncertain at
the time of planting decisions due to weather
variability. We treat yields as exogenous—i.e.,
farmers do not increase expected yields in
response to an increase in expected revenue.
Although crop yields are affected by sev-
eral factors that the farmer controls, such
as management practices and fertilizer use,
it is not clear to what extent farmers make
substantial changes in these factors in the
short run in response to changes in expected
revenue. Indeed, recent econometric evi-
dence on yield response to price is mixed.
For example, econometric evidence from
Berry and Schlenker (2011) indicates a weak
relationship between yields and crop prices,
while Goodwin et al. (2012) find a stronger
effect. Bhaskar and Beghin’s (2010) model
of base updating incorporates changes in
fertilizer application that a farmer may make
in order to alter the crop yield to capture
benefits from an update of base yields in the
future, but they find a negligible effect of
base updating on nitrogen application.
Assumption 3. No dynamic complementar-
ity in production.
For simplicity, we assume that current crop
acreage decisions do not affect production in
subsequent years. Thus, profit maximization is
a static problem in our model, except for the
effect of current acreage decisions on future
government payments. In many cropping
systems there exist incentives to rotate crops
that create dynamic complementarity in
production (e.g., see Hennessy 2006). Incor-
porating the dynamic optimization implied
by these crop rotation incentives would sub-
stantially complicate our model. For example,
an increase in corn acreage due to expected
base updating may occur by shifting land
from a continuous soybean rotation to a
corn-soybean rotation; Hendricks, Smith, and
Sumner (2013) show that switching these
rotations causes a larger increase in corn
acreage in the short run than in the long run.
In this article, we only examine the change in
corn acreage that occurs from moving to the
new long-run equilibrium (i.e., steady-state).
Our approach to modeling crop rotations in
a static, equilibrium framework is similar to
Feng and Babcock (2010).
Assumption 4. The aggregate acreage
of each crop is the solution to the profit
maximization problem of a representative
producer. Market returns are concave in the
acreage of the two crops and the optimal
acreage of each crop is positive.
We view our model of expected profit
maximization as a stylized representation
of acreage decisions in aggregate, rather
than a precise representation of an indi-
vidual farmer’s behavior. Although our
stylized model implies symmetry of cross-
price effects, we do not impose this symmetry
in the numerical simulations. Instead, we
use elasticities in the simulations that are
representative of recent econometric evi-
dence. In many regions, total land planted to
crops changes little. Although our conceptual
model does not impose an acreage constraint,
it can be informally incorporated into the
model by considering plausible elasticities.
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We use elasticity estimates from Hendricks,
Smith, and Sumner (2013) in our numerical
simulations, and their elasticities reflect very
few changes in total land planted to corn and
soybeans in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana.
Assumption 5. The planning horizon
incorporates two future farm bills. The first
year governed by the next farm bill is denoted
f, and the first year governed by the farm bill
after that is denoted F. The timing of the farm
bills is known with certainty. The planning
horizon ends in year T.
We include only the next two farm bills
in the model because any potential benefits
from updating in farm bills further into the
future are largely discounted and are likely
to have a negligible impact on current pro-
duction decisions. Incorporating uncertainty
about the timing of the policy changes is left
for future research.
Assumption 6. There are three policy sce-
narios for each farm bill: (a) base acres and
base yields are updated for both crops; (b)
base acres and base yields are not updated
but the programs continue; or (c) direct and
counter-cyclical payments are ended for both
crops. Farmers assign a probability δ that
base is updated and a probability μ that the
programs are ended.
To simplify the model, we assume there
are only three policy scenarios so that we can
analyze the effect of the probability of base
updating, δ, on production decisions.
Assumption 7. If base updating occurs,
then updating is mandatory and the updated
base acres are calculated as a linear function
of previous planted acres. Updated base yield
is not affected by the number of acres previ-
ously planted. Base yield is not updated unless
base acres are also updated. The rules of
base updating are the same in each farm bill.
However, updated base acres are calculated
using planted acreage from a subset of years
governed by the preceding farm bill.
Assumption 7 describes how the base
updating is implemented if a farm bill does
update base. We do not intend to model the
implementation of a specific piece of legis-
lation. For example, we do not attempt to
model all of the voluntary updating options
that were included in the 2002 Farm Bill.3
3 See Young et al. (2005) for a description of the voluntary
base updating options in the 2002 Farm Bill.
Instead, our model is developed to illus-
trate general principles about the effect of
expected policy changes—within the con-
text of base updating—on production in a
multicrop system.
We assume that base updating is manda-
tory. This assumption allows us to solve our
model without backward recursion as dis-
cussed later in remark 1. Mandatory updating
also imposes smoothness on the optimization
problem so that we can approximate the
effect of base updating using derivatives. If
base updating is voluntary, then the optimiza-
tion function is not smooth because farmers
are likely to only update base if it increases
their expected direct and counter-cyclical
payments. If base updating is voluntary but
the state of nature makes it such that it is
not profitable for farmers to update, then
our results will overestimate the effect of
base updating. In our numerical simulations,
we find that the effects of expected base
updating are small when accounting for the
multicrop nature of agriculture, and these
results may still overestimate the effect of
base updating. We also assume that updated
base acres are a linear function of previously
planted acres. For example, base acres in the
United States are calculated as an average of
previously planted acres.
We assume that updated base yield does
not depend on the number of acres previ-
ously planted to the crop. One potential
violation of this assumption is that planting
more corn may reduce corn yield due to
a “yield drag” of planting corn after corn.
Another violation would occur if changing
acreage resulted in the crop being planted on
soils with a different productivity. These yield
effects are likely to have negligible impacts
on the effect of base updating on produc-
tion decisions, so we omit them to simplify
the model. Our model allows for the pos-
sibility that base yield is not updated when
base acres are updated, but base yield is not
updated unless base acres are also updated.4
Finally, while we assume that the rules of
base updating are the same for each farm bill,
the period used to update base acres changes.
Updated base acres are calculated from a
subset of years governed by the preceding
farm bill. This means that current planted
acreage may be used to update base acres
4 In other words, there is not an incentive to plant a limited
number of acres of the crop to increase base yields in an update,
while still maintaining previous base acres.
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in the next farm bill (farm bill f ), but will
not be used to update base acres in the farm
bill after the next one (farm bill F). Current
planted acreage affects payments during farm
bill F only if base is updated in farm bill f
and not updated in farm bill F .
Optimization Problem
A representative farmer chooses the current
acreage of two crops to maximize expected
market returns, plus government payments
in the current year, plus the stream of dis-
counted direct and counter-cyclical payments
during future farm bills. The farmer solves
the following optimization problem:
max
a0
E0
⎧⎨
⎩r (p˜0, y˜0, a0)+
∑
j∈c,s
(5)
× [ ˜LDPj0 + B˜Pj0] +
T∑
t=f
∑
j∈c,s
βt B˜Pjt
⎫⎬
⎭
where E0 denotes the expectation formed
at the time of planting the current crop, a0
is a vector of the acres planted to each crop
in the current year, p˜0 is a vector of crop
prices, y˜0 is a vector of crop yields, r(·) is the
market return from crop production, L˜DPjt
are loan deficiency payments for crop j as in
equation (4), B˜Pjt are base payments (direct
and counter-cyclical payments) as in equation
(3), and β is the discount factor. The current
year is denoted by t = 0, the next farm bill
begins in t = f , and the last year in the plan-
ning horizon is T . Expected base payments
during future farm bills affect the current
acreage decision through the possibility of
base updating. The two crops are corn (j = c)
and soybeans (j = s). The acres, price, and
yield of crop j are denoted ajt , p˜
j
t , and y˜
j
t in
subsequent derivations. A tilde (∼) indicates
that the variable is stochastic.
There are four stochastic variables for each
crop: price, yield, base yield, and base acres.
For simplicity, we assume that price and yield
distributions are stationary from year to year.
Loan deficiency payments are stochastic in
equation (5) because prices and yields are
stochastic. Base payments are stochastic
for two reasons. First, base yield and base
acres are known with certainty during the
current farm bill, but the payment rate is
uncertain because counter-cyclical payments
depend on the stochastic market price. Sec-
ond, base yield and base acres are uncertain
during future farm bills because base may be
updated in the future farm bill.
Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) argue that
only the portion of government payments
retained by tenants should be included in
the model of acreage decisions. For example,
nonfarming landowners may capture a por-
tion of government payments by increasing
rent. Nonfarming landowners, however, are
likely to influence tenants to make planting
decisions such that all government payments
are reflected in the acreage decision; thus,
we include all government payments in the
decision of the representative farmer.
Remark 1. Future decisions do not affect
the optimal current acreage from assumptions
3 and 7.
While future government payments affect
current acreage decisions through base
updating, future decisions themselves do
not affect the current acreage decision.
Therefore, the solution to the problem does
not require backward recursion. Note that
in our model the producer does not have
control over the decision to update base in
future years since we assume mandatory base
updating. Therefore, in our model the cur-
rent acreage decision does not depend on an
optimal base updating decision in the future.
Furthermore, base payments are completely
decoupled in our model, except through
base updating, so optimal acreages during
future farm bills do not depend on base pay-
ments within those years. In other words, the
marginal benefit of altering current acreage
to increase base payments in the future does
not depend on future acreage decisions. We
show explicitly in the online appendix that
writing the model as a Bellman equation
simplifies to the model in equation (5) under
our assumptions.
Several assumptions are required for
future decisions to not affect the opti-
mal current acreage. First, we assume no
dynamic complementarity in production
(assumption 3). Second, we assume that base
updating is mandatory (assumption 7). Third,
we assume that base acres are updated as
a linear function of historical planted acres,
so marginal government benefits—if base
updating occurs—do not depend on acreage
in other years (assumption 7).
Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) solve their
model with backward recursion because they
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allow for voluntary base updating. In this
model, the marginal benefits of altering cur-
rent acreage to increase base payments in the
future depends on the farmer’s decision of
whether or not to update base in the future,
which is affected by the state of nature. Our
assumption of mandatory base updating
simplifies the problem and may lead us to
overstate the effect of base updating, even
though our numerical simulations indicate
small effects of base updating. The authors de
Gorter and Fisher (1993) evaluate a program
where current planted acreage only affects
future government payments if the farmer
diverts acreage in the future. Therefore,
future decisions affect the optimal current
acreage in the models of Bhaskar and Beghin
(2010) and de Gorter and Fisher (1993).
We distribute the expectation operator
through the summation in (5). In remark
2, we define the form of the expected base
payments during each farm bill.
Remark 2. From assumptions 5, 6, and 7
we can write the expected value of base pay-
ments for crop j during each of the farm bills
as follows: in the current year (t = 0) expected
base payments are:
(6) E0B˜P
j
t =E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYj0BA
j
0,
while under the next farm bill (t = f , . . . ,
F − 1), expected base payments are
E0B˜P
j
t = δE0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYjf BA
j
f
(
ajf−
)
(7)
+ (1 − μ − δ)E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
× BYj0BAj0,
and under the farm bill after the next one
(t = F , . . . ,T), expected base payments are:
E0B˜P
j
t = δ2E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYjFBA
j
F
(
ajF−
)
+ δ (1 − μ − δ)E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYjf BA
j
f
×
(
ajf−
)
+ (1 − μ − δ) δE0θj
(
p˜jt
)
× BYjFBAjF
(
ajF−
)
+ (1 − μ − δ)2
× E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYj0BA
j
0.
(8)
Expression E0θj(p˜
j
t) is the expected pay-
ment rate on base yield and base acres from
equation (3). Expected base payments under
the current farm bill in equation (6) depend
on a fixed base yield (BYj0) and base acres
(BAj0).
Expected base payments under the next
farm bill (farm bill f ) in equation (7) are
the sum of base payments under different
policy scenarios weighted by the probability
of each scenario. The three policy scenar-
ios are as follows: (a) with probability δ,
base is updated to a new base yield (BYjf )
and base acres (BAjf ); (b) with probability
1 − μ − δ, the current programs continue
without base updating, or (c) with prob-
ability μ, programs are ended and there
are no direct or counter-cyclical payments.
From assumption 7, updated base acres are a
function of the acres planted in years imme-
diately prior to the new farm bill (denoted
ajf−). We assume that planted acres in the
current period (aj0) are included in the cal-
culation of updated base acres in the next
farm bill. From assumption 7, updated base
yield is not a function of previous acreage.
We assume that updated base yield is inde-
pendent of future market prices. In principle,
there is likely a correlation between the
historical average of farm-level yields and
market prices during the future farm bills, but
such a correlation is likely small and would
have a negligible effect on our numerical
simulations.
To model expected base payments under
the farm bill after the next one (farm bill F)
in equation (8), we consider the joint dis-
tribution of potential policy outcomes from
the two future farm bills. In the first term,
base is updated in both farm bills with joint
probability δ2. In the second term, base is
updated in farm bill f but not farm bill F
with joint probability δ(1 − μ − δ). In the
third term, base is not updated in farm bill
f , but is updated in farm bill F with joint
probability (1 − μ − δ)δ. In the fourth term,
base is not updated in either farm bill with
joint probability (1 − μ − δ)2. There are no
base payments in farm bill F if direct and
counter-cyclical payments are ended in either
farm bill. If base acres are updated in farm
bill F , then base acres are a function of acres
planted in years immediately prior to the
farm bill (denoted ajF−). Planted acres in the
current period (aj0) are not included in the
calculation of updated base acres in farm
bill F .
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After substituting equations (6)–(8) into
the optimization problem in (5), we derive
the following first order conditions for the
optimal corn and soybean acreage in the
current year:
∂E0r(·)
∂aj0
+ E0ηj
(
p˜j0
)
y˜j0 + δ jf(9)
+ δ (1 − μ − δ) jF = 0, ∀ j ∈ {c, s}
where
(10)  jf =
F−1∑
t=f
βtE0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYjf
∂BAjf
∂aj0
,
and
(11)  jF =
T∑
t=F
βtE0θj
(
p˜jt
)
BYjf
∂BAjf
∂aj0
.
The term ∂E0r(·)
∂aj0
denotes marginal expected
market returns (i.e., marginal expected mar-
ket revenue minus the marginal expected
cost of production). The term E0ηj(p˜
j
0)y˜
j
0
denotes marginal expected loan deficiency
payments, while  jf is the present value of
additional government payments during farm
bill f from planting another acre of crop
j in the current year if base is updated in
farm bill f . Further,  jF is the present value
of additional government payments during
farm bill F from planting another acre of
crop j in the current year if base is updated
in farm bill f , but is not updated in farm bill
F . Note that current acreage does not affect
government payments during farm bill F if
base is updated in farm bill F
(
∂BAjF
∂aj0
= 0
)
.
The expression δ jf + δ(1 − μ − δ) jF repre-
sents the expected present value of marginal
government payments from base updating.
Thus, the optimal acreage will be such that
the marginal expected market returns plus
marginal expected loan deficiency payments,
plus the present value of marginal expected
government payments from base updating
equals zero for each crop.
Before examining the effect of expected
base updating on acreage decisions, we define
the structural acreage elasticity.
Definition 1. The structural corn acreage
elasticities are movements along the marginal
cost function in the absence of government
distortions:
εcc = −∂
2E0r (·)
∂as0∂a
s
0
p¯cy¯c
|H| a¯c ,(12)
εcs = ∂
2E0r (·)
∂ac0∂a
s
0
p¯sy¯s
|H| a¯c ,(13)
where the elasticity is evaluated at average
prices (p¯j), yields (y¯j), and acreage (a¯c). The
determinant of the Hessian is denoted |H| and
is positive by the second order condition for
profit maximization.
The derivation of the structural acreage
elasticities is standard for profit maximiza-
tion with two outputs, except that prices and
yields are stochastic. In the absence of gov-
ernment distortions, the farmer maximizes
expected market returns,
max
a0
E0r
(
p˜0, y˜0, a0
)
(14)
=E0
[
p˜c0y˜
c
0a
c
0 + p˜s0y˜s0as0 − cost
(
ac0, a
s
0
)]
,
where cost (·) is the cost function. Note that
(14) is a static maximization problem since
we assume there is no dynamic comple-
mentarity in production (assumption 3). We
distribute the expectation operator and write
E0(p˜
j
0y˜
j
0) =E0(p˜j0)E0(y˜j0) + Cov(p˜j0, y˜j0) from
the definition of covariance. The first order
conditions that define optimal acreage in the
absence of government programs are:
∂E0r(·)
∂aj0
= pj0yj0 + Cov
(
p˜j0, y˜
j
0
)
− ∂cost
∂aj0
(15)
= 0, ∀ j ∈ {c, s} ,
where pj0 is the expected price of crop j at
the time of planting in the current year,
and yj0 is the expected yield. We assume
that the expected covariance of price and
yield does not depend on the expected price(
∂Cov
(
p˜j0,y˜
j
0
)
∂pj0
= 0
)
. The structural corn acreage
elasticities in (12) and (13) are obtained by
applying the implicit function theorem to
the system of equations in (15) (see online
appendix for derivation).
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Effect of Base Updating on Acreage
First we examine the effect of base updating
on acreage, where we approximate the per-
centage change in acreage due to expected
base updating by using the midpoint rule as a
numerical approximation. The midpoint rule
states that acreage with the probability of
base updating equal to δ¯ equals the acreage
with a zero probability of base updating, plus
δ¯ multiplied by the change in acreage from
a change in the probability of base updat-
ing evaluated at δ¯/2, which can be written
as ac0(δ¯) = ac0(0) + δ¯ ∂a
c
0
∂δ
(
δ¯
2
)
. Rearranging the
midpoint rule provides the change in acres
planted to corn relative to the average acres
planted to corn (i.e., percentage change) if
the probability of base updating occurring is
δ¯ instead of zero,
(16) αc = a
c
0
(
δ¯
)− ac0 (0)
a¯c
= δ¯
a¯c
∂ac0
∂δ
(
δ¯
2
)
.
The derivative of corn acreage with respect
to the probability of base updating is found
by applying the implicit function theorem to
the system of equations in (9). Plugging the
derivative into the numerical approximation
of (16) provides an approximation for the
percentage change in corn acreage due to
expected base updating (see online appendix
for derivation):
αc = εcc δ¯
c
f + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯)cF
p¯cy¯c
(17)
+ εcs δ¯
s
f + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯)sF
p¯sy¯s
,
where  jf and 
j
F are defined in equations
(10) and (11). The numerator in the first
term provides the present value of expected
marginal government revenue of corn acres
during the next two farm bills with a proba-
bility of base updating of δ = δ¯. This is divided
by the marginal market revenue to provide
the relative increase in expected marginal
revenue from expected base updating. The
expected increase in marginal revenue is
translated into an acreage effect through the
structural own-price elasticity. Similarly, the
second term translates the expected increase
in marginal revenue for soybeans due to
expected base updating into an acreage effect
through the structural cross-price elasticity.5
The change in corn acreage due to
expected base updating can be interpreted
as the change in acres compared to a sce-
nario of no base updating, where direct and
counter-cyclical payments are expected to
continue (δ¯ = 0, μ = 0), or this change can
be compared to a scenario where direct and
counter-cyclical payments are expected to
end (δ¯ = 0, μ = 1). In both of these scenarios,
the probability of base updating is zero.
Since we assume that base is updated for
both crops if a farm bill updates base, the
total effect of base updating on corn acreage
is the sum of two effects: the effect due to an
increase in marginal revenue for corn acres,
and the effect due to an increase in marginal
revenue for soybean acres. Neglecting to
account for the loss of base of the alternative
program crop overestimates the effect of
base updating on acreage if the two program
crops are substitutes (negative cross-price
elasticity), and underestimates the effect of
base updating on acreage if the two program
crops are complements (positive cross-price
elasticity).
The effect of expected base updating on
program crop acreage depends on the rela-
tive size of government payments between
the alternative land uses and the magnitude
of the cross-price elasticity relative to the
own-price elasticity. Farmers will seek to
increase the acreage of the crop with a rela-
tively large payment rate. The effect of base
updating on acreage may even be negative
if the program crops are strong substitutes
in production and the expected government
payment of the alternative crop is relatively
large.
We can express the percentage change in
acreage due to expected base updating rela-
tive to the structural own-price elasticity to
provide a measure of the degree of coupling
of direct and counter-cyclical payments,
αc
εcc
= δ¯
c
f + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯)cF
p¯cy¯c
(18)
+ ε
cs
εcc
δ¯sf + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯)sF
p¯sy¯s
.
5 Our model is similar to equilibrium displacement models or
Muth models (Muth 1964) in that we estimate the percentage
change in quantity from an exogenous factor using elasticity
parameters to approximate the market response.
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In other words, equation (18) indicates
the percentage change in acreage due to
expected base updating relative to the per-
centage change in acreage from a 100%
increase in the price of corn. Note that our
measure of coupling is different from esti-
mates that indicate the change in acreage
due to a change in direct and counter-cyclical
payments (e.g., econometric estimates).
Effect of Base Updating on Response
to Market Price
Next, the effect of base updating on acreage
response to market price is considered. We
derive the acreage response to price in the
presence of government payments, then com-
pare the magnitude of this response relative
to structural elasticities. We consider the
cases where changes in market prices are
perceived to be transitory or permanent. If
farmers perceive a change in market price in
the current year to be transitory, then they
expect price to resume to some long-run
mean in future years. If farmers perceive a
change in market price in the current year
to be permanent, then they expect the mean
price to remain at the new level in future
years.6
Case 1. If changes in market prices in the
current year are perceived to be transitory,
then the acreage elasticities with respect to
market prices in the presence of government
payments (denoted εˆcc and εˆcs) relative to the
structural elasticities are as follows (see online
appendix for derivation):
εˆcc
εcc
= 1 + ∂E0η
c
(
p˜c0
)
∂pc0
,(19)
εˆcs
εcs
= 1 + ∂E0η
s
(
p˜s0
)
∂ps0
,(20)
where pj0 is the expected price of crop j at the
time of planting in the current year.
In case 1, the derivatives are only with
respect to a change in the expected price in
the current year, since the change in price
is transitory. Expected base updating has
no effect on the response to market prices
6 To simplify, we ignore potential differences in the acreage
response to transitory and permanent price shocks due to dif-
ferences in the short-run and long-run cost structures of the
farm.
when the changes in prices are transitory.
Direct and counter-cyclical payments do not
distort the expected revenues in the current
year since farmers cannot alter their base
in the current year. On the other hand, loan
deficiency payments can distort the expected
revenues in the current year. Loan deficiency
payments partially offset changes in total
expected revenue (i.e., market revenue and
government revenue) when market prices
change, so equations (19) and (20) are less
than one, and loan deficiency payments
dampen the acreage response to market
price.
Case 2. If changes in market prices in the
current year are perceived to be permanent,
then the acreage elasticities with respect to
market prices in the presence of government
payments (denoted εˆcc and εˆcs) relative to the
structural elasticities are as follows (see online
appendix for derivation):
εˆcc
εcc
= 1 + ∂E0η
c
(
p˜c0
)
∂pc
(21)
+ δ¯
∂cf
∂pc + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯) ∂cF
∂pc
y¯c
,
εˆcs
εcs
= 1 + ∂E0η
s
(
p˜s0
)
∂ps
(22)
+ δ¯
∂sf
∂ps + δ¯
(
1 − μ − δ¯) ∂sF
∂ps
y¯s
,
where
∂
j
f
∂pj
=
F−1∑
t=f
∂E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
∂pj
BYjf
∂BAjf
∂aj0
,(23)
∂
j
F
∂pj
=
T∑
t=F
βt
∂E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
∂pj
BYjf
∂BAjf
∂aj0
,(24)
where pj is the expected price of crop j in all
future years formed at the time of planting in
the current year.
In case 2, the derivatives are with respect
to a change in the expected price in all future
years, since the change in price is perma-
nent. The third terms in equations (21) and
(22) account for the effect of expected base
updating on acreage response to market
price. Note that the expected payment rate
E0θj
(
p˜jt
)
only depends on market prices due
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to counter-cyclical payments, so direct pay-
ments do not affect the acreage response to
market price through expected base updat-
ing. Thus,
∂
j
f
∂pj is the present value of the
change in expected marginal counter-cyclical
payments from a permanent change in the
market price during farm bill f if base is
updated in farm bill f . Similarly, ∂
j
F
∂pj is the
present value of the change in expected
marginal counter-cyclical payments from a
permanent change in the market price during
farm bill F if base is updated in farm bill f ,
but is not updated in farm bill F . The third
terms in equations (21) and (22) give the
change in expected marginal counter-cyclical
payments relative to the change in expected
marginal market revenue (i.e., expected
yield) from a price increase.
If a change in the market price is per-
ceived to be permanent, then the change
affects a farmer’s expectation of the future
counter-cyclical payment rate. Expected
future counter-cyclical payments partially
offset the change in expected market revenue
when market prices change, and these future
counter-cyclical payments are linked to cur-
rent acreage decisions through expected base
updating. Thus, counter-cyclical payments
will dampen acreage response to mar-
ket price in the presence of expected base
updating.
Note that government payments dampen
both the acreage response to own-price and
acreage response to cross-price. If marginal
government payments are larger for the alter-
native crop, then the decrease (in absolute
value) of the cross-price elasticity will be
larger than the decrease in the own-price
elasticity. Thus, government payments not
only affect the response to own-price, but
also the amount of substitution between
crops in response to changes in market
demand.
Numerical Simulations
We use the analytical results in the previous
section to simulate the effect of expected
base updating on corn and soybean produc-
tion in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. The online
appendix contains a script to replicate our
numerical simulations using the open source
R software. Parameter values used in the
simulations are given in table 1.
A discount factor of 0.95 is used.7 It is
assumed that farm bill f is implemented one
year from the current year and lasts for six
years, then farm bill F is implemented for
another six years. Average prices are the
average 2006–2010 marketing year average
prices at the national level. We calculate the
yield for Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana for each
year by taking the total production across the
three states, and dividing by total harvested
acres using National Agricultural Statistics
Service state-level data. Average yields are
the average 2006–2010 yields for the three
states.
If base is updated, then it is assumed that
base acres in the next farm bill are calculated
from a four-year average of previous planted
acreage that includes acreage in the cur-
rent year such that
∂BAjf
∂aj0
= 0.25. We assume
that base yields are also updated. Updated
base yields are the 2006–2010 average yield,
multiplied by a discount factor of 0.935. In
the 2002 update of base, if farmers updated
base acres, then they could update counter-
cyclical base yields with a discount factor of
0.935. If farmers expect that base updating
will be voluntary, or expect to only update
counter-cyclical base yields, then our simula-
tions overestimate the effect of expected base
updating. Again, we do not intend to model a
specific historical scenario.
In the simulations, we vary farmers’ per-
ceived probability of base updating between
0 and 1. If the probability of base updating
is positive, then we assume that the prob-
ability of the programs ending is zero. If
the probability of base updating is zero,
then the simulation results may be inter-
preted as either (a) the effect with direct
and counter-cyclical payments continuing
with no expected base updating, or (b) the
effect with a 100% probability of direct and
counter-cyclical payments ending.
The cross-price elasticity is likely to be
negative and large relative to the own-price
elasticity for corn and soybeans since the
crops are commonly grown in rotation in
Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana, and there is typ-
ically little change in total acres planted to
the crops. The cross-price elasticity is likely to
be larger for soybean acreage because corn
is typically the more profitable crop in the
rotation, and soybeans are grown to capture
7 This implies an interest rate of 5.26%.
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Table 1. Parameter Values Used in the Simulations
Parameter Description Value(s)
Fixed Parameters
β Discount rate 0.95
f Years to first farm bill 1
F Years to second farm bill 7
T End of second farm bill 12
p¯c Average price of corn 4.01
p¯s Average price of soybeans 8.84
y¯c Average corn yield 168
y¯s Average soybean yield 48
∂BAjf
∂Aj0
Change in base acres in the next farm bill from
an increase in acres planted in the current year
conditional on updating occurring
0.25
BYcf Updated base yield for corn 157
BYsf Updated base yield for soybeans 45
λ Discount factor for base payments 0.85
Dc Direct payment rate for corn 0.28
TPc Target price for corn 2.63
LRc Loan rate for corn 1.95
Ds Direct payment rate for soybeans 0.44
TPs Target price for soybeans 5.80
LRs Loan rate for soybeans 5.00
Varying Parameters
δ¯ Probability of base updating [0,1]
μ Probability of direct and counter-cyclical payments
ending
{0,1}
εcs
εcc
Ratio of cross-price to own-price elasticity for corn
acreage
{−0.75, 0}
εsc
εss
Ratio of cross-price to own-price elasticity for
soybean acreage
{−1.25, 0}
E0θc
(
p˜ct
)
Expected base payment rate for corn {0.44, 0.24}
E0θs
(
p˜st
)
Expected base payment rate for soybeans {0.54, 0.37}
∂E0θc
(
p˜ct
)
∂pc
Change in expected base payment rate for corn
from a permanent change in price
{−0.232, −0.002}
∂E0θs
(
p˜st
)
∂ps
Change in expected base payment rate for
soybeans from a permanent change in price
{−0.091, −0.002}
Note: In the “low-price” scenario, the mean of the distribution of anticipated prices during future legislation is $2.00 for corn and $5.00 for soybeans,
corresponding to the larger expected base payment rates and larger changes in the expected base payments from a change in price. In the “high-
price” scenario, the mean of the distribution of anticipated prices during future legislation is $5.00 for corn and $12.50 for soybeans, corresponding
to the smaller expected base payment rates and smaller changes in the expected base payments from a change in price.
benefits from rotating the crops. For our
estimates of the ratio of elasticities, we use
recent econometric evidence by Hendricks,
Smith, and Sumner (2013) that indicates the
ratio is about −0.75 for corn acreage and
about −1.25 for soybean acreage.8 We also
8 Miller and Plantinga (1999) estimate that the ratio is about
−0.4 for corn acreage, and about −1 for soybean acreage. Chavas
and Holt (1996) estimate that the ratio is about −0.5 for corn
acreage, and about −2 for soybean acreage.
present simulation results with an elasticity
ratio of zero to provide estimates if changes
in returns to the alternative crop from base
updating are ignored.
Since the base payment rate, θj(p˜jt), is non-
linear in prices, we simulate its expected
value. Note that the relevant parameter is
the expected direct and counter-cyclical
payment rate in periods governed by future
legislation, rather than the expected payment
rate in the current period. We assume that
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anticipated prices during future legislation
are distributed lognormally. To estimate
the volatility of prices across several years,
we calculate the standard deviation of the
logarithm of marketing-year-average prices
from 1990 to 2010. We consider two scenarios
for mean prices: (a) “low prices” with the
mean price of corn equal to $2.00/bu and the
mean price of soybeans equal to $5.00/bu,
and (b) “high prices” with the mean price of
corn equal to $5.00/bu and the mean price of
soybeans equal to $12.50/bu. For each price
scenario, we randomly draw 10,000 prices
from a lognormal distribution and calculate
θj(p˜jt) from equation (3) using policy param-
eters from the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills, and
reported in table 1. In the low-price scenario,
we estimate that the average base payment
(per bushel of base) is $0.44 for corn and
$0.54 for soybeans. In the high-price scenario,
we estimate that the average base payment
rate is $0.24 for corn and $0.37 for soybeans.
It could be argued that ‘higher” prices are
likely to be the new normal due to several
factors including increased meat demand,
slowing productivity growth, and increased
biofuel production. We argue, however, that
the low-price scenario is still relevant because
it represents a scenario where the target price
is greater than the effective price (i.e., direct
payment rate plus the higher of the market
price and the loan rate). Alternatively, we
could simulate a scenario with high market
prices and higher target prices.
We also simulate the change in the
expected base payment rate from a per-
manent change in price, ∂E0θ
j(p˜jt)
∂pj . For each
price scenario, we decrease the mean price by
$0.10, then randomly draw 10,000 new prices
to estimate the new expected value of the
base payment rate. The change in the mean
base payment rate divided by the change in
mean price is our estimate of ∂E0θ
j(p˜jt)
∂pj . In the
low-price scenario, we estimate that the base
payment rate increases by $0.023 for corn
and $0.009 for soybeans with respect to a per-
manent $0.10 decrease in the mean price. In
the high-price scenario, we estimate that the
change in the base payment rate with respect
to a permanent change in price is negligi-
ble for corn and soybeans. When the mean
of anticipated prices in the future is high,
expected counter-cyclical payments are very
small, so a change in the mean price has a
negligible effect on expected counter-cyclical
payments.
Numerical Results for the Effect on Crop
Acreage
Results for the effect of base updating on
corn acreage are presented in figure 1. We
present the results as the percentage change
in corn acreage from expected base updating
relative to the percent change in corn acreage
that would occur from a 100% increase in the
price of corn, calculated using equation (18).
Results for the effect on soybean acreage
are presented in figure 2. The effect of base
updating on soybean acreage is obtained by
reversing the corn and soybean indices in
equation (18).
The x-axis in figures 1 and 2 varies the
probability of base updating occurring in
future farm bills. The solid line indicates
results with a ratio of the cross-price and
own-price elasticity consistent with recent
econometric estimates. The dashed line indi-
cates results with a zero cross-price elasticity.
The top panel provides results for a low-price
scenario and the bottom panel gives results
for a high-price scenario.
The degree of coupling is concave in the
probability of base updating. If farmers per-
ceive a large probability of base updating,
then they are likely to expect that the stream
of benefits from changing current acreage
will not last long because base is likely to be
updated again in the farm bill after the next
one. The effect of base updating is larger (in
absolute value) in the low-price scenario than
the high-price scenario because expected
counter-cyclical payments are larger in the
low-price scenario. That is, larger future gov-
ernment payments are captured by altering
current acreage in the low-price scenario.
Under all of the parameter combina-
tions considered, expected base updating
has a positive effect on corn acreage. The
effect of base updating on soybean acreage,
however, is negative when the ratio of the
cross-price elasticity to own-price elasticity
is −1.25. Expected base updating has a nega-
tive effect on soybean acreage because corn
base receives a larger payment than soybean
base. Farmers will increase corn acreage to
increase future payments, but a large negative
cross-price elasticity indicates that they will
decrease soybean acreage.
The results with a zero cross-price elasticity
reflect the effect of expected base updating
on crop acreage, but neglecting to account
for the alternative program crop. If the alter-
native program crop is ignored, the effect
of expected base updating on corn acreage
 at :: on June 17, 2014
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Hendricks and Sumner The Effects of Policy Expectations 917
Probability of Base Updating Occurring
Pe
rc
en
t C
ha
ng
e 
in
 C
or
n 
Ac
re
s 
fro
m
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
Ba
se
 U
pd
at
in
g
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 C
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 1
00
%
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 P
ric
e
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.0
0
0.2
5
0.5
0
0.7
5
1.0
0
Low
 Price Scenario
H
igh Price Scenario
Ratio of
Elasticities
Cross/Own=−0.75
Cross/Own=0
Figure 1. The effect of expected base updating on corn acreage
Note: The graphs indicate the percentage change in corn acres from expected base updating relative to the percentage change in corn acres that
would occur from a 100% increase in the price of corn calculated from equation (18). The x-axis varies the probability of base updating occurring.
The solid line indicates results with a ratio of the cross-price and own-price elasticity consistent with recent econometric estimates. The dashed line
indicates results with a zero cross-price elasticity.
is overestimated by 72% in the low-price
scenario, and by 114% in the high-price
scenario.9 The effect of expected base updat-
ing on soybean acreage is of the opposite
sign—but nearly the same magnitude—if the
alternative program crop is ignored.
The effect of expected base updating
on corn and soybean acreage is relatively
small, even for parameters that we think
will overestimate the effect. For example, if
we assume low prices, that the probability
of base updating is 0.50, and that there is a
cross-price to own-price elasticity ratio of
−0.75, then the increase in corn acres due to
expected base updating is 5.1% as large as
the increase in acres from a 100% increase in
9 The difference between the price scenarios is that the relative
base payments between corn and soybeans differ between the
price scenarios, since counter-cyclical payments are larger in the
low-price scenario.
the price of corn. Assuming the same param-
eters for soybean acreage, but a cross-price
to own-price elasticity ratio of −1.25, then
the decrease in soybean acres is 6.1% as
large as the increase in acres from a 100%
increase in the price of soybeans. If the corn
and soybean own-price elasticities are 0.3,
then expected base updating leads to a 1.5%
increase in corn acres, and a 1.8% decrease
in soybean acres at low prices. Assuming the
same parameter values but high prices, base
updating increases corn acreage by 0.7%, and
decreases soybean acreage by 0.8%.
The estimates of changes in corn and soy-
bean acreage due to expected base updating
can be interpreted as the change in acres
compared to a scenario of no base updating,
and direct and counter-cyclical payments
are expected to continue (δ¯ = 0, μ = 0)
compared to a scenario where direct and
counter-cyclical payments are expected to
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Figure 2. The effect of expected base updating on soybean acreage
Note: The graphs indicate the percentage change in soybean acres from expected base updating relative to the percentage change in soybean acres
that would occur from a 100% increase in the price of soybeans calculated by reversing the corn and soybean indices in equation (18). The x-axis
varies the probability of base updating occurring. The solid line indicates results with a ratio of the cross-price and own-price elasticity consistent
with recent econometric estimates. The dashed line indicates results with a zero cross-price elasticity.
end (δ¯ = 0, μ = 1). Policy discussions in 2012
and 2013 suggest that direct payments are
likely to be eliminated in the next farm bill
and replaced with a revenue insurance pro-
gram more closely tied to actual production.
Prior to this, farmers may have expected
direct and counter-cyclical payments to con-
tinue with potential base updating.10 Our
results indicate that a revision of policy
expectations from potential base updating
to an expectation that the programs would
end leads to a decrease in corn acreage, and
an increase in soybean acreage before the
10 We do not attempt to provide a precise date when policy
expectations may have changed.
next farm bill—albeit by less than 1% in the
high-price scenario.11
Numerical Results for the Effect on Acreage
Response to Price
Results for the effect of expected base updat-
ing on corn acreage response to permanent
changes in market prices are presented in
figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 gives the own-price
elasticity with expected base updating rel-
ative to the structural own-price elasticity,
calculated with equation (21) and setting the
effect of loan deficiency payments equal to
11 This assumes that farmers do not expect payments in the
new program to depend on planted acreage during the previous
farm bill.
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Figure 3. Own-price elasticity of corn acreage with expected base updating relative to
structural own-price elasticity
Note: The graphs provide the own-price elasticity of corn acreage with expected base updating relative to the structural own-price
elasticity—calculated with equation (21) and setting the effect of loan deficiency payments equal to zero. The x-axis in each plot varies the
probability of base updating occurring. The solid line indicates results for a low-price scenario, and the dashed line indicates results for a high-price
scenario.
zero. Figure 4 provides the cross-price elas-
ticity with expected base updating relative to
the structural cross-price elasticity, calculated
with equation (22) and setting the effect of
loan deficiency payments equal to zero. If a
change in price is viewed as transitory, then
expected base updating will have no effect
on acreage response to market price. Thus,
we view the results in figures 3 and 4 as the
largest effect on supply response to price that
is plausible from expected base updating. We
set the effect of loan deficiency payments
equal to zero
(
∂E0ηj
(
p˜j0
)
∂pj = 0
)
to isolate the
effect of expected base updating on supply
response to price, not because the effect of
loan deficiency payments is unimportant.
The x-axis in figures 3 and 4 varies the
probability of base updating occurring in
future farm bills. The solid line indicates
results for a low-price scenario, while the
dashed line indicates results for a high-price
scenario. Note that the effects in equations
(21) and (22) do not depend on the ratio of
the cross-price elasticity to the own-price
elasticity.
In the low-price scenario, expected base
updating dampens corn acreage own-price
response (figure 3) because expected future
counter-cyclical payments partially offset
the change in expected market revenue, and
these future counter-cyclical payments are
linked to current acreage decisions through
expected base updating. Expected base
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Figure 4. Cross-price elasticity of corn acreage with expected base updating relative to struc-
tural cross-price elasticity
Note: The graphs illustrate the cross-price elasticity of corn acreage with expected base updating relative to the structural cross-price
elasticity—calculated with equation (22) and setting the effect of loan deficiency payments equal to zero. The x-axis in each plot varies the
probability of base updating occurring. The solid line indicates results for a low-price scenario and the dashed line indicates results for a high-price
scenario.
updating also dampens corn acreage cross-
price response (figure 4), since changes in
soybean prices are also offset by counter-
cyclical payments for soybean base. Ignoring
the multicrop context ignores the effect of
expected base updating on cross-price elas-
ticities. In the high-price scenario, expected
base updating has a negligible effect on
own-price and cross-price acreage responses
because expected counter-cyclical payments
are negligible.
For corn acreage, expected base updating
has a larger dampening effect on own-price
elasticity than the cross-price elasticity, while
for soybean acreage, expected base updating
has a smaller dampening effect on the own-
price elasticity than the cross-price elasticity
(results not shown). Expected base updating
has a larger dampening effect on changes
in corn prices than soybean prices because
the expected counter-cyclical payments are
relatively larger for corn.
Assuming that the probability of base
updating is 0.5 and a low-price scenario, the
corn acreage own-price elasticity is 81% of
the structural own-price elasticity, and the
cross-price elasticity is 93% of the structural
cross-price elasticity. Note, however, that
these estimates assume a permanent change
in market price, and expected base updating
has no effect on supply response to price
when changes in market prices are transitory.
Since many price changes are likely to be per-
ceived as transitory and prices have recently
been high, econometric models that seek
to estimate structural supply response with
recent data are not likely to have substantial
bias due to base updating.
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Conclusion
This article considers the effect of expecta-
tions about future policy on the acreage of
program crops. The full effect of an expected
change in policy on program crop acreage
is best understood in a multicrop context
because farmers would most likely expect
that a change in policy would be imple-
mented for all relevant program crops, and
program crops are often substitutes or com-
plements in production. We illustrate the
importance of placing the model in a mul-
ticrop context by considering the effects of
expected base updating on corn and soybean
production in the Corn Belt of the United
States.
Recent policy discussions in the United
States and Europe suggest that direct pay-
ments may be reduced or eliminated in favor
of more revenue insurance. Our results indi-
cate that such policy expectations lead to a
decrease in corn acreage and an increase in
soybean acreage. Further, our results have
implications for understanding the effect of
these policy changes on trade distortions—
and therefore the welfare of farmers in
developing countries (Babcock and Paulson
2012). We find that for corn and soybeans,
direct payments likely have a relatively small
acreage impact, and thus the shift towards
revenue insurance will likely increase trade
distortions.
Our results emphasize the importance of
considering the multicrop nature of agri-
cultural production and policy expectations
as they relate to the implications of antic-
ipated policy changes. For example, even
though soybeans are a program crop, corn
has a larger base payment rate and the two
crops are substitutes in production. Our
numerical simulations indicate that expected
base updating—as applied by the United
States—has limited effects on corn and soy-
bean acreage. The effect of expected base
updating has likely been larger, however, for
cotton and rice, which have had large direct
and counter-cyclical payment rates relative
to payment rates of alternative crops, and
which are often grown in regions with less
direct substitution with other program crops.
The effect of base updating on wheat and
sorghum production may have been larger as
well. Substitution with other program crops is
likely smaller for wheat and sorghum because
competing land uses such as alfalfa, fallow,
and pasture are not eligible for program
payments.
We also find that expected base updating
dampens both the own-price and cross-price
acreage responses. The numerical simulations,
however, indicate small differences between
the acreage response to price with expected
base updating and the structural acreage
response to price, since base updating only
affects market response to price if changes in
current prices are perceived as permanent.
In contrast, McDonald and Sumner (2003)
found that response to market price was one-
third to one-fourth of the structural response
for rice under an acreage reduction program
implemented prior to 1996. Chavas and Holt
(1990), among others, proposed methods to
account for the effect of the loan rate on the
distribution of anticipated prices, but other
government programs have proven more
difficult to account for in econometric work.
Our results indicate that post-1996 data may
provide the best period in recent history to
estimate supply elasticities in the United
States that are close to structural elasticities.
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